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v. BA?\'K OF' "\mmrcA o8!1

[48 C.2d 689; 312 P.2d 251]

[L.A. _:\io. 24459.

In Bank.

June 21, 19;17.]

1\IARTIN SCHOOL OF AVIATION, INC. (a Corporation),
Apprllant, v. BANK OF Al\1EHICA NA'riONAIJ
TRCST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIA'I'ION (a National
Assoeiation , as Executor, etc., Hespondent.
[1] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Extent of Power of
Court.--\Vhen findings of fact are attacked on the ground
that thPre ifi not any substantial evidence to sustain them,
the power of an appellate court hegins nnd ends with the
determination whether there is any substantial evidence, contl'adieted or uncontradicted, that will support the findings.
[2] Aeronautics-Injuries to Aircraft--Evidence.-ln a bailor's
action against the bailee's executor for destruction of a rented
airplane which crashed, findings that the bailee and pilot
agreed they would not take the plane from the ground if the
weather was not good and did not agree that the plane would
not he taken from the ground "until after daybreak" were
sustained by a report filed by a man, experienced in aviation
matters, with the Civil Aeronautics Authority on the dny of
the accident, in which he stated that the bailee and pilot made
nrrnngrments to use the plane to go on a dove hunting trip,
thnt they wanted to leave and return early in order to get the
hunting over before it was too hot, that the pilot told him
"he would check the weather before leaving and wouldn't go
if the weather was not good," and that, aftee lE~arning of the
aecident, the investigator "found it was a complete washout"
and that "It is impossible for me to figure out what could have
caused this accident as the ship went iu at a great speed and
nearly straight in."
[3] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact--Consideration of Evidence.-Evidence and inferences in conflict with evidence in
support of findings of fact must be disregnrded by the Supreme
Court on appeal, in considering sufficiency of evidence to sustain findings.
[4] Aeronautics-Injuries to Aircraft-Evidence.-ln a bailor's
action against the bailee's executor for destruction of a rented
airplane which erashed, a finding that when the flight started
"the weather was good at the time" wns sustained by evidPnce
that the sky was clear above 2,000 feet, that the pilot wns an
experienced instrument flyer, and that the only possibly
[2] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Aviation,§ 26; Am.Jur., Aviation,§ 26.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1235; [2, 4-6]
Aeronautics, § 3; [3] Appeal and Error, § 1242; [7] Trial, § 380.
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unfavorable weather condition was a cloud bank of about 1,200
foot depth above the airfield at the time of takeoff, it not being
necessary for visual flight conditions to prevail in order that
flying weather be "good."
[5] !d.-Injuries to Aircraft-Evidence.-In a bailor's action
against the bailee's executor for destruction of a rented airplane which crashed, a finding that the plane was not operated
negligently was sustained by the absence of any evidence that
the bailee was negligent, that the terms of the bailment were
breached, or that there was a conversion, and by an investigator's report to the Civil Aeronautics Authority that "It is
impossible for me to figure out what could have caused this
accident to happen as the ship went in at a great speed and
nearly straight in."
[6] !d.-Injuries to Aircraft-New TriaL-In a bailor's action
against the bailee's executor for destruction of a rented airplane which crashed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the bailor's motion for a new trial where,
during argument at the close of the trial, the judge expressed
the opinion that the bailment contract contained a condition
as to daylight departure and that the condition was violated,
and the court then, on its own motion, reopened the case for
further evidence on the issue of visibility and the meaning of
"daylight," and where the bailor had ample opportunity to
introduce its evidence prior to submission of the case, additional evidence regarding the terms of the bailment contract
was introduced, and the case was twice continued for further
evidence.
[7] Trial-Findings-Expressions of Judge as Impeaching.-The
findings of fact and conclusions of law constitute the decision,
which is the final deliberate expression of the court; expressions of a judge during trial cannot be considered for the
purpose of contradicting deliberate findings and conclusions
that he subsequently makes and files.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Frederick F. Houser, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to recover damages for value of an airplane which
was destroyed in an accident. Judgment for defendant affirmed.

\Viuthrop 0. Gordou aud Nathan \V. 'l'al'l' for Appellant.
"William ,] Cnsad\. for l{t>Spo!Hleut.
[7] See Cal.Jur., Trial, §§ 174, 232; Am.Jur., 'rrial, §§ 1145, 1147
et seq.
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McCOMB, ,J.~-From a judgment in favor of dPfendant
after trial before the court in an action to recover damages
for the destnwtion of its airplane, plaintiff appeal:;;.
Pacts: Plainiiff, Martin R(~hool of Aviation, Inc., a eorporation, sues as assignee of a partnership eonsisting of Floyd
R. Martin, ,Joseph G. Hager and ,J. W. Martin, Jr., which
had been doing business under the firm name of Martin School
of Aviation. Defendant is sued as executor of the estate of
Charles E. Rhoades, deceased. Hereafter the partnership
will be referred to as plaintiff and decedent Rhoades as defendant.
Plaintiff owned an instrument-equipped Bonanza airplane
which it rented to defendant for a flight to the Imperial
Valley. Arrangements were made for defendant by 0. A.
Kier, an experienced and competent pilot, who acted as pilot
of the plane. 'Within three minutes after the flight commenced the plane crashed. Defendant, the pilot and C. 0.
Gregg, all occupants of the plane, were killed.
The amended complaint in three counts alleges: (1) that
the bailment was made to defendant upon condition that
''they would not take, or cause said plane to be taken, off
from the ground until after daybreak and unless the weather
was clear"; that the plane took off before daybreak and
before the weather was clear, and that it was so negligently
operated as to cause it to crash to the ground; (2) after
incorporating by reference the averments as to the terms of
the rental conditions, that defendant ''failed to return said
airplane to plaintiffs in violation of their said agreement of
bailment, and wrongfully breached said agreement of bailment to plaintiffs' damage"; and (3) after incorporating the
previous averments of the terms of the bailment, that defendant "promised to return said airplane in good condition and
wilfully and negligently failed and refused to return said
airplane to plaintiffs and converted the same to his own use."
The trial court found that:
(a) Defendant and Pilot Kier agreed that they would not
take or cause said plane to be taken from the ground if the
weather was not good;
(b) Defendant and Pilot Kier did not agree that the
plane would not be taken from the ground "until after daybreak'';
(c) When the flight started "the weather was good at
that time";
(d) 'l'he plane was not operated nrgligently;
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The terms of the bailment were not breached; and
(f) '!'here was no conversion.
(Jucstions: ] 1 irst. Was there substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings (a), (b), (c) and (d), supra?
[1] This question must be answered in the affirmative,
awl is governed by this rule : vVhen findings of fact are attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence
to sustain them, the power of an appellate court begins and
ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that will
support the findings of fact. (Primrn v. P1·irnrn, 46 Cal.2d
690, 693 ll] [299 P.2d 231] .)
Applying this rule to the present case, a recital of a
portion of the evidence with reference to each of the questioned findings discloses substantial evidence to support them:
[2] Ji'indings (a) and (b). John Martin, a man experienced in aviation matters and in investigating accidents with
the Civil Aeronautics Authority, on the day of the accident
filed a report with the C.A.A. which was received in evidence. The material portion reads: "Mr. Rhoades and Red
Kier made arrangements to use our Bonanza N8632A to go to
Brawley, California, on a dove hunting trip and wanted to
leave and return early in order to get the hunting over before
it got too hot in Brawley. Kier told rne he would check the
weather befm·e leaving and wouldn't go if the weather was
not good. I was called at home about 5 :45 a. m. by my
brother and he said the airport guard called and said that
he thought ICier had cracked up. I left at once for the scene
of the accident and found it was a complete washout and was
not anything left of value. All three persons in the airplane
were killed. It is impossible for me to figure out what could
have caused this accident as the ship went in at a, great speed
a,nd nearly stmight in. The only information I have is what
people in the vicinity had to say." (Italics added.)
Clearly, the italicized portion of Mr. Martin's statement and
the absence of any other evidence as to weather conditions
before the plane >YaR taken into the air constituted substantial
evidence to sustain the trial court's questioned findings (a)
and (b). [3] Conflicting evidence and inferences must, of
course, be disregarded by this court. (See Prirnm v. Primm,
supm, p. 694 [2] .)
[ 4] Finding (c). The evidence established that at the
time of takeoff there was a cloud bank above the airfield and
surrounding area, with the ceiling being somewhere between
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200 ancl 1,000 feeL 'l'he offieial weather repol'1s placed the
ceiling at about 800 feet. Horizontal visibility was estimaterl
at from one to seven miles, and there was no fog. The top
of the elond layer was approximately 2,000 frrt, and above
that level the skies were clear and visibility unrestricted.
'fhe following Air Traffic Control Regulations (Code of
l~'ederal Regulations, tit. 14, pt. 60) apply to intrastate as well
as interstate flights and prescribe, among other things, minimum safe altitudes and rules for visual and instrument flights
with rrspect to ceilings and cloud formations:
Sec·tion 60.17 prescribes minimum safe altitudes. So far as
pertinrnt here it rPads: "Minimum safe altitudes. Except
whrn nPcessary for take-off or landing, no person shall operate an aircraft below the following altitnd<~s: ... (h) Over
congr·strd areas. Over the congested areas of <;ities, towns or
settlements, or over an open-air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstaele 1riihin a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet from the aircraft. . . . (c) Over
other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above
the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated
areas. In such event, the aircraft shall not be operated closer
than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure . . . .
(d) IFR operations. The minimum IFR altitude established
by the Administrator for that portion of the route over which
the operation is condueted .... "
The Visual Flight Rules are prescribed by sertion 60.30,
whirh read: "Ccili11g and distance [Tom clouds. Aircraft
shall comply with the following requirements as to ceiling
and distance from clouds: (a) Within control zones. Unless
authorized by air traffic control, aircraft shall not be flown
when the ceiling is less than J ,000 feet, or less than 500 feet
Yertically and 2,000 feet horizontally from any cloud formation. (b) Elsewhere. ·when at an altitude of more than 700
fret above the snrfaee aircraft shall not be flown lrss than 500
feet vertically and 2,000 feet horizontally from any cloud formation; wben at an altitude of 700 fret or less aircraft shall
not be flown nnless clear of clouds."
Ceiling is defined in section 60.72: "Ceiling. The distance
from the surface of thf~ ground or water to the lowest cloud
layer reported as 'broken clouds' or 'ovrrr,ast.' "
"IFR" means instrument flight rules (§ 60.82), and "IFR
<·onditions" arr~ defined as: "Wrather r'onditions below the
minimum preseribed for flights under VPR.'' ( § 60.83.)
"VFR conditions" are defined as: ""Weather conditions equal
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to or above the minimum prescribed for flights under VFR.''
(§60.89.)
Section 60.41 reads: "IFR flight p~an. Prior to take-off
from a point within a control zone or prior to entering a
control area or control zone, a flight plan shall be filed with
air traffic control. ... "
It is to be noted that there was no evidence that the path of
flight was to go through congested areas within the meaning
of the Visual Flight Rules. If the ceiling was 800 to 1,000
feet the airplane could fly at an altitude up to 700 feet and
still comply with those rules if no control zones or congested
areas were involved.
It is not necessary for visual flight conditions to prevail
in order that the flying weather be "good." There is a
difference between ''good'' weather and ''clear'' weather in
this regard. ''In 'clear weather,' when the pilots can navigate their planes by 'pilotage,' that is, by visual operation
from markings and landmarks along the airways, and can
clrarly see other aircraft or obstructions in time to avoid
collision, flights may be governed by the Visual Flight Rules.''
(Wilson & Bryan, Air Transportation (1949), p. 160.) It
may be "good" flight weather even though it is not "clear"
within this definition.
In the instant case the sky was clear above 2,000 feet, there
was no evidence of any frontal activity or local turbulence in
the air, and the only possibly unfavorable weather condition
was the cloud bank of about 1,200 foot depth. The pilot was
an experienced instrument flyer, and a bank of stratus at such
a ceiling is not bad weather for an instrument-rated pilot in
an instrument-equipped plane. Thus, even if visual flying
('Onditions did not prevail, there was no showing that the pilot
did not comply with the Instrument Flight Rules or that the
weather was not "good" for an instrument flight. Under
these drcumstances it cannot be said as a matter of law
i hat it was not "good" flying weather, and the foregoing
evidence fully sustains the trial court's finding (c).
[5] Finding (d). There is a total absence of any evidence
that defendant was negligent, or that the terms of the bailmrnt wet·e breached, or that there was a conversion. The
trial court's finding on these points is sustained by Mr.
Martin's report to the C.A.A. set forth above, wherein he
said, "It is impossible for me to :figure out what could have
caused this accident as the ship went in at a great speed and
nearly straight in.''
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[6] Second: Did the trial court abuse its rliscret£on 1:11
denying plaintiff's rnotion for a new tr·ial?
No. Plaintiff contends that it was surprised and misled by
the court into not introducing certain evidence. During the
argument at the close of the trial the judge expressed the
opinion that the bailment contract contained a condition as to
daylight departure and that the condition was violated. The
court then, on its own motion, reopened the case for further
evidence on the issue of visibility and the meaning of tJp~
word "daylight."
The record shows that plaintiff bad ample opportunity
to introduce its evidence prior to submission of the case, as
the judge made clear his willingness to hear any evidence
offered, and additional evidence regarding the terms of the
bailment contract was actually introduced. The case was
twice continued for further evidence, and after submission
the trial court made the findings set forth above.
[7] The findings of fact and conclusions of law constitute
the decision, which is the final deliberate expression of the
court. Expressions of a judge during the trial cannot be
considered for the purpose of contradicting deliberate findings of fact and conclusions of law that he subsequently makes
and files. (Strudth.off v. Yates, 28 Cal.2d 602, 615 [5] [170
P.2d 873]; DeCotr v. Howell, 190 Cal. 741, 751 [7] [214 P.
444]; People v. Driggs, 111 Oal.App. 42, 44 [1] [295 P. 51].)
It thus appears that there was no ground for granting a
new trial and that the trial judge's action in denying the
motion was correct.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, 0. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spenee, J., coneurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I adopt herewith as my dissenting opiniOn in the above
entitled case the able and learned opinion written by 1Vlr.
Justice Ashburn of the District Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division 'fwo, and whieh is reported in
(Cal.App.) 303 P.2d 1084.
For the reasons stated therein, I would reverse the judgment.

